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PARENT AND CHILD-CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF CHILD:
PARENTAL ALIENATION: TRASH TALKING THE
NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT IS NOT OKAY
Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896
I. FACTS
Diane Nygaard and Mark Hendrickson were married in New Rock-
ford, North Dakota on August 9, 1980.1 Throughout the marriage,
Mark was employed in Dickinson while Diane worked in Jamestown.
2
The Hendricksons purchased a home in Jamestown, but because of
Mark's job in Dickinson, he was only able to be at the family home on
weekends and holidays. 3 Diane had a daughter, Carissa, who was five
years old at the time of the marriage.4 Mark and Diane had four chil-
dren together: Carinna born on November 23, 1981, Anthony born on
September 2, 1983, Matthew born on March 14, 1986, and Andrew born
on July 23, 1988.5
Diane raised the children on her own during the week, while Mark
was home to help only on weekends and holidays. 6 The long-distance
arrangement took its toll.7 The marriage deteriorated, and the children
did not have strong emotional ties with their father.8 Mark began to
come home sporadically on weekends and stopped bringing home his
1. Brief for Appellee at 4, Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson 1), 553 N.W.2d 215 (N.D.
1996) (No. 950331).
2. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson 1), 553 N.W.2d 215, 216 (N.D. 1996). The dis-
tance between Dickinson and Jamestown is 199.2 miles; this equals a driving time of three hours and
forty-two minutes. Yahoo! Maps, available at http://maps.yahoo.com. (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
3. Hendrickson 1, 553 N.w.2d at 216.
4. Id. Mark did not adopt Carissa; however, he and Diane raised her, aided by seventy-five
dollars per month child support from the child's biological father. Transcript on Appeal at 674-75,
Hendrickson I (No. 950331). Mark was abusive toward Carissa over the years. See Trial Court
Transcript at 807-11, Hendrickson I (No. 950331) (recording testimony by Carissa about Mark's
abuse toward her). The three older children saw this abuse and identified with it. Hendrickson 1, 553
N.W.2d at 218. They saw no difference between Carissa's status and their own. Id.
5. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hendrickson 1, 553 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1996) (No. 950331).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Appellee's Brief at 7, Hendrickson I (No. 950331). Mark testified at trial that he tried several
times to persuade Diane to move with the children to Dickinson. Psychological Evaluation of Mark at
2, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 111, Hendrickson I (No. 950331). She refused to move. Id.
Diane stated that she and Mark planned the family home to be in Jamestown and that he would move
back as soon as he could find suitable employment in the Jamestown community. Guardian ad Litem
Carla Godfrey's report, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 131, Hendrickson I (No. 950331). Mark
found no suitable position for his "bookkeeper/accountant/project manager" skills. Id.
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paycheck. 9 Diane filed for divorce on November 30, 1993.10 An
interim order specified that Diane was to have custody of the children
during the divorce proceedings with reasonable visitation for Mark. 11
Mark had difficulty with visitation from the start. 12 The court tried
facilitating by setting more definite visitation schedules.1 3 Mark would
drive to Jamestown for his visitation with the children and be told that
they had other plans for the weekend. 14 The court then appointed Carla
Godfrey as guardian ad litem (GAL) to assist in making the visitations
work. 15
The divorce trial ended with the district court granting custody of
the children to Diane.16 Mark was granted reasonable visitation and Ms.
Godfrey was retained as GAL to facilitate that visitation. 17 Mark ap-
pealed the divorce judgment to the North Dakota Supreme Court on
October 5, 1995.18 The North Dakota Supreme Court decided Hendrick-
son v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson 1)19 on September 10, 1996.20 The
court did not change the custody of the children, as Mark had requested
on appeal. 21 Because it had taken almost one year to decide this case, the
9. Transcript on Appeal at 346, Hendrickson I (No. 950331). Mark stated that he stopped bring-
ing home his paycheck because Diane was not paying the bills. Transcript on Appeal at 186,
Hendrickson I (No. 950331). He told Diane to send him the bills, and he would pay them. Id.
10. Summons and Complaint, Appendix of Appellant's Brief at 9-12, Hendrickson I (No.
950331).
11. Appellant's Brief at 2, Hendrickson I (No. 950331).
12. Id. at 5-6. Mark had only one holiday visitation with the children, which was Christmas of
1993. Id. The times he was allowed visitation, it was never with all four children. Appendix to Appel-
lant's Brief at 46, Hendrickson I (No. 950331). Diane always had plans for at least two of them. Id.
13. Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 32, Hendrickson I (No. 950331) (scheduling visitation on
Saturday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., and on Sunday from 12:00 p.m. to 5 p.m.); Appellant's Brief at 3,
Hendrickson I (No. 950331) (scheduling visitation every second and fourth weekend starting on
Friday at 5:30 p.m. and ending on Sunday at 5 p.m.).
14. Appellant's Brief at 6, Hendrickson I(No. 950331).
15. Stipulation Appointing Guardian Ad Litem, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 56, Hendrickson
I (No. 950331). The guardian ad litem (GAL) reported that the weekend-long visitations were a big
part of the problems between Mark and the children. GAL Report, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at
138, Hendrickson I (No. 950331). Mark would rent a motel room in Jamestown when he had
visitation with the children. Id. The children did not like being cooped up in that room for a whole
weekend. Id. at 142. The GAL stated that the children would be equally unhappy being cooped up
with Diane for all weekend. Id. The children also missed being with their friends. Id at 139.
16. Memorandum Opinion, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 182, Hendrickson I (No. 950331).
The court stated two factors that were decisive: (1) It was natural for the children to be attached to
their home in Jamestown, and (2) Mark's treatment of Carissa had affected the way the three oldest
children of the marriage felt about their father. Id.
17. Id. at 182-83. The divorce was final on August 8, 1995. Appellant's Brief at 4, Hendrickson
I (No. 950331). The GAL was appointed through June 30, 1996. Memorandum Opinion, Appendix to
Appellant's Brief at 183, Hendrickson I (No. 950331).
18. Notice of Appeal, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 224, Hendrickson I (No. 950331).
19. 553 N.W.2d 214 (N.D. 1996).
20. See generally Hendrickson 1, 553 N.W.2d 214 (N.D. 1996).
21. Hendrickson 1, 553 N.W.2d at 218.
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delay and lack of closure created further deterioration of Mark's
relationship with his children.
22
After the termination of GAL Godfrey's appointment, the district
court appointed Karen Mueller as the new GAL.23 Ms. Mueller met with
the children and parents and arranged for a visitation between Mark and
the children to take place on July 25, 1997.24 When Diane brought the
children to Bismarck for the scheduled visitation, she left them at Ms.
Mueller's office and then went to her daughter Carissa's home. 25 The
children refused to go with their father, however, when he arrived to pick
them up. 26 They ran away, and Mark called the police.27 Everyone,
including Ms. Mueller, ended up at the police station in Bismarck. 2
8
Diane was contacted at her daughter's home and went to the police
station with both Carissa and Carissa's husband Clinton. 29 At this time,
Clinton verbally assaulted Ms. Mueller, telling her she was being paid by
Mark and, therefore, would do whatever he wanted.30 Diane told the
children that they needed a lawyer, rather than telling them they needed
to go with their dad.3 1 In spite of this, Mark did eventually get the
children for five days. 32
The situation ultimately deteriorated to the point where everything
was done through the court. 33 Both Mark and Diane tried to prevail by
filing motions with the court. 34 District court Judge Hilden notified the
22. Testimony from Court Trial Before Judge Hilden, Brief for Appellant at 25, Hendrickson v.
Hendrickson (Hendrickson 11), 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220 (No. 980124). The GAL scheduled a
weekend visitation for the children and Mark. Id. at 27-8. He picked up the children, drove about
five blocks, and stopped at a stop sign. Id. When the car stopped, the children jumped out of the car
without saying anything and ran away from the back of the car. Id. Mark drove to the nearest phone
and called Diane but there was no answer. Id. at 28-9. He found out later that Diane was waiting in
her car a block behind the stop sign. Id. at 29. Diane tells a different version of the story. Id. at 106.
She was taking Carissa to work at her uncle's car wash business and saw the kids running across the
field and crying. Id. at 107. In fact, Diane filed child abuse and neglect charges against Mark for
throwing the children out of the car and leaving them in the middle of nowhere. Transcript of
Proceeding at 29, Hendrickson II (No. 980124).
23. Transcript on Appeal at 3, Hendrickson H (No. 980124). Diane confronted Ms. Mueller at
her office in Bismarck. Transcript of Proceedings at 112, Hendrickson II (No. 980124). Ms. Mueller
told Diane that she should get rid of her bitterness, and then kicked her out of the office. Id. This
resulted in the GAL's indication that she would not be able to work on the case. Appellee's Brief at
3-4, Hendrickson 11 (No. 980124). The court issued another order on July 3, 1997, appointing Ms.
Mueller as GAL and stating that the parties, including the children, were to cooperate with her. Id.
24. Appellee's Brief at 9, Hendrickson II (No. 980124).
25. Id. Carissa was married to Clinton Wilkinson and living in Bismarck. Id. at 9-10.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 9-10.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Transcript of Court Trial at 4, Hendrickson II (No. 980124).
34. Id. Motions were filed to stay visitation, reconsider guardian ad litem fees, change custody,
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parties that a hearing would be held to address the motions. 35 Both
Mark and Diane were present with their lawyers, and both parties
testified.36 Former GAL Carla Godfrey also testified.37 Karen Mueller
had submitted her GAL report to the court earlier, and Judge Hilden
accepted the report as a court exhibit.
38
In her report, GAL Mueller recommended that (1) Stutsman County
take custody of the children, 39 (2) all six family members see the same
therapist, (3) Diane and Mark attend post-divorce counseling together, as
well as go to individual counseling, (4) Mark and the children go to
bi-weekly counseling with brief visitation either before or after and with
no extended family members present, and (5) Mark attend parenting
classes.n0
Judge Hilden adopted Karen Mueller's report and issued his order
on December 9, 1997.41 He stated:
This is the most outrageous case of deliberate frustration
of visitation and child alienation that I have ever seen.
and request that the hearing be in Stutsman County (the Jamestown area). Id.
35. Register of Actions, Notice of Hearing, Action No. 428, Brief for Appellant Appendix at 14,
Hendrickson I (No. 980124).
36. Table of Contents, Transcript of Court Trial at 2, Hendrickson H (No. 980124). Mark testi-
fied about the difficulties he had making visitations with the children. Transcript of Court Trial at 8-32,
Hendrickson (No. 980124). Cross-examination addressed the relationship problems that Mark had
with his children and the need for Mark to take affirmative steps to solve the problems. Id. at 32-41.
When Diane testified, she alluded to Mark sexually abusing Carinna. Id. at 142. When Carinna was a
baby, Mark would hold her on his lap and call her his little princess. Transcript on Appeal at 475,
Hendrickson 1, 553 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1996)(No. 950331). Diane testified that her mother and older
daughter Carissa told her they saw Mark "feel [Carinna] up and down. Whether it would be the chest
part, [or] the rear part." Transcript of Court Trial at 142, Hendrickson 11 (No. 980124). Diane
admitted during cross-examination that she never saw Mark fondle Carinna. Id. at 152.
37. Table of Contents, Transcript of Court Trial at 2, Hendrickson H (No. 980124). Ms. Godfrey
testified that she did not see a campaign of alienation on the part of either parent. Id. at 52-53. She
saw the problems as mostly situational: Mark's weak relationship with the children because of his
living apart from them during the week during the marriage; the children's dislike of being cooped up
in a motel room all weekend; and their desire to be with their friends and not miss their activities. Id.
In addition, the children felt that if they lost their dad it would not change their lives much. Id. at 51.
They would not have to move out of their house or change schools or activities. Id.
38. Transcript of Trial Court at 4, Hendrickson H, (No. 980124). Ms. Mueller had been sum-
moned, but was not able to be at court due to scheduling problems. Id. She thought both parents were
involved in a power struggle and were to blame. Karen Mueller's GAL Report, Brief for Appellee
Appendix at 16, Hendrickson 1I (No. 980124). She also thought Diane's family contributed to the
alienation and frustration of visitation. Id. at 15. Mueller stated, "[a]ll the adults involved in this
conflictual situation share the blame for the chronic hostility and the horrendous position these four
children have been placed in and have suffered through." Id. Mueller addressed Diane's suspicion
of Mark's sexual abuse. She stated in her report, "Either Diane's family is lying and Diane knows it
and made this up or Diane has a lack of regard for her daughter's well being; to the extent that it is
more important for her (Diane) to look good in the divorce proceedings." Id. at 54.
39. Karen Mueller's GAL Report, Brief for Appellee Appendix at 25, Hendrickson H (No.
980124). It was important to get the children out of the alienating environment. Id. at 23. If Mark
lived in Jamestown, Mueller would have recommended a change of custody to him. Id.
40. Id. at 25-27.
41. Order of District Court, County of Stark, Southwest Judicial District, Page 1, at Brief for
Appellee Appendix at 28, Hendrickson H (No. 980124).
528
CASE COMMENT
I find that the report of Karen Mueller is entirely credible and,
in large part, I adopt her recommendations....
Further, I find that Diane has been by far the greatest cause of
this fractured and dysfunctional family.4 2
Stutsman County refused to take custody of the children, and a
frustrated Judge Hilden was required to issue a final order on February
24, 1998. 43 Judge Hilden stated:
This is the most outrageous case that I have seen since I
began law school twenty-five years ago. Diane's continuing
pattern of alienating behavior has pretty much destroyed
Mark's hope of a meaningful relationship with his children.
Basically, there has been no visitation since this divorce was
commenced. Now, six large files, a Supreme Court appeal and
tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys fees later, there seems
to be no hope of reasonableness.
The report of guardian ad litem, Karen Mueller, which I
have adopted in full and upon which I continue to rely, tells
... by deed and innuendo, [how] Diane rewards the children's
rejection of their father making this perhaps the worst case of
alienation syndrome in the history of the United States ...
[Diane's] statement on the stand that she has 'tried and tried'
to encourage visitation is patently ridiculous.
I would order Diane to report to jail . . . if I could do so
without harming the children. But in jail, Diane would proba-
bly lose her job, house and car .... [W]ith the currently exist-
ing relationship between Mark and his children . . . I [cannot]
now give Mark custody whether or not Diane goes to jail.4 4
42. Id. Judge Hilden ordered five things. Id. at 28-29 First, the custody of the children was to be
turned over to Stutsman County Social Services. Id. at 28 The children were to be removed from
Diane's custody if her alienating behavior continued. Id. The County was also to monitor therapy and
treatment of all six individuals involved. Id. Second, Stutsman County Social Services was to select
the therapist to be seen by all six individuals. Id. at 29. The therapist was to keep the County informed
of therapy progress. Id. No extended family members on either side were to interfere with, or be
present at Mark's visitation. Id. Third, Stutsman County Social Services was ordered to report to
Judge Hilden after ninety days. Id. The Judge would determine if alienating behavior (from the par-
ties or extended family members) was occurring, and then impose a jail sentence of thirty days on the
applicable person. Id. Fourth, Stutsman County was to file a report to Judge Hilden every ninety days
until the youngest child was eighteen years of age, or until Judge Hilden issued an order changing the
requirement. Id. Fifth, Judge Hilden denied all other pending motions. Id.
43. Id. at 30-32.
44. Order of District Court, County of Stark, Southwest Judicial District at 1-2, Hendrickson 11,
590 N.W.2d 220 (No. 980124).
52920011
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Judge Hilden then sought to create an economic incentive for Diane
to stop the alienating behavior.4 5 He ordered that Mark's child support
payments be put in escrow for the children's post-secondary educa-
tions.4 6 Each child was to receive his/her distribution at age twenty-
three.4 7 Judge Hilden stated that he would reconsider this order if Diane
succeeded in persuading the children of the importance of having a
relationship with their father.48 Judge Hilden ordered that Mark contin-
ue to have reasonable visitation, and also ordered Diane to pay Mark's
attorney's fees of $2,000.49
Diane appealed the order, 50 and Mark cross-appealed.51 For the
second time, the Supreme Court of North Dakota looked at Hendrickson
v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson 11).52 It determined that the lower court
was in error when it ordered that the child support payments be put in
escrow 53 and remanded the case to reverse that order.54
Judge Hilden held the remand hearing on April 26, 1999, to deal
with the many motions that had accumulated. 55 He granted only one of
the many motions: Diane's motion for release of the child support pay-
ments in escrow. 56 Judge Hilden stated that Diane "has been in continu-
ous and willful contempt of court for the approximately four years that
I've had this file." 57 He found that there was a significant change in
circumstances, and it was necessary that custody be changed to Mark.58
He ordered Diane to pay child support and also ordered that Diane be
denied visitation for one year. 59 Finally, he ordered that all of the parties
attend counseling. 60
45. Id. at 31,
46. Id.
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Appellant's Brief at 16, Hendrickson H (No. 980124). Diane raised the issues of whether
placing the child support payments in escrow was erroneous and whether awarding Mark attorney's
fees was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1.
51. Appellee's Brief at 39, Hendrickson H (No. 980124). Mark raised both of Diane's issues in
his brief and defended the court's order. Id. at 1. He raised a third issue, whether the lower court was
in error when it did not change custody of the children to their father. Id.
52. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson I1), 1999 ND 37, 2, 590 N.W.2d 220, 221.
53. Id. 8, 590 N.W.2d at 223. The court noted that the guidelines show that child support is
supposed to be paid to the custodial parent for the children's current needs. Id. 1 9.
54. Id. 115.
55. See Transcript of hearing in District Court, County of Stark, Southwest Judicial District at 3-7,
Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson I1), 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896 (No. 990123)
(identifying motions for change of custody, change of venue, attorney's fees, motion to dismiss, motion
for continuance, permit for supervisory writ to change judge, and others).
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 23-24.
59. Id. at 24.
60. Id. With regard to the counseling, other documents show that the judge ordered Diane to go
530
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Diane appealed the decisions of the remand hearing, and the North
Dakota Supreme Court looked at Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrick-
son 11)61 a third time.62 The primary purpose of this decision was to
determine child custody issues.63 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a
change of venue, (2) there was enough evidence to warrant changing
custody of the children to Mark, (3) Diane as the noncustodial parent
was entitled to supervised visitations, and (4) the counselor for Diane was
to be chosen from among the names on lists to be supplied to the trial
court by both Mark and Diane.
64
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Around the middle of the twentieth century, most states followed the
"tender years" doctrine when they made child custody decisions.
6 5
This doctrine stated that a child needs his or her mother during the early
years, with the result that custody of young children always went to the
mother unless it could be proven that she was unfit.66 During the
women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s, all of this changed.
6 7
Women went to work in great numbers and left their children with
caregivers. 68 This negated the argument that a child must be with his or
her mother during the tender years because the mother would likely be
working and not staying at home taking care of the child.69 In addition,
with more women working outside the home, fathers found themselves
taking a larger role in raising the children. 70 As more fathers sought
to counseling with a counselor chosen by Mark. See Appellant's Brief at 20, Hendrickson III, (No.
990123) (stating the court abused its discretion when it ordered Diane to attend counseling with a
counselor of Mark's choosing); see also Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson 111), 2000 ND I,
22, 603 N.W.2d 896, 903 (discussing Diane's contention that the trial court abused its discretion when
it ordered her to go to counseling with a counselor of Mark's choice).
61. 2000 ND 1,603 N.W.2d 896.
62. Hendrickson III, 1, 603 N.W.2d at 898.
63. See generally Hendrickson 11, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896.
64. Id. 25, 603 N.W.2d at 903.
65. Shannon D. Sexton, A Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent With the
Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and Equitable Custody System, 88 Ky.
L.J. 761, 768-69 (1999-2000).
66. Id. at 769-70. Sexton refers to the 1959 edition of Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.) showing
an unfit mother as unable to assume the responsibilities of motherhood or unable to "provide a suitable
home." Id. at 768 n.60. Compare this description with the 1978 C.J.S. edition in which the age, health,
and sex of the child are considered first, and "when all other considerations ... are equal, the mother
is the proper custodian where a child is of tender age [that] require[s] the care and attention . . . a
mother is especially fitted to bestow . . . unless the mother is for some reason unsuitable or unfit
67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 21 (1978).
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custody of their children, more legislatures did away with the tender
years doctrine. 71
Typically, legislatures replaced the tender years law with a "best
interests of the child" standard. 72 This standard contained several fac-
tors that a court had to weigh and balance when determining the place-
ment or modification of custody of the child.73 Examples of the factors
are: "(1) the wishes of the child and guardians; (2) the relationship of
the child and each guardian; (3) the child's 'adjustment' to his/her
home, education, and community environment; (4) evidence of domestic
violence; (5) the mental and physical health of all involved; and (6)
consideration as to who has been the primary care-giver." 74
With the "tender years" presumption removed, the parent who bet-
ter met the best interests of the child, as determined by the above-listed
factors, would be awarded custody. 75 By the 1980s, this change in law,
combined with no-fault divorce, caused the courts to be flooded with
custody disputes. 76 Into this setting came the additional problem of
parental alienation. 77
A. PARENTAL ALIENATION
An early definition of parental alienation was formed in 1949 by a
California appellate court: "parental alienation occurs when a parent
pursues a consistent course of action calculated to prevent any close
relationship existing between the child and the other parent, causing the
child's mind to become 'poisoned and prejudiced' against the other
parent." 78 By 1987, a leading child psychotherapist, Richard Gardner,
71. Id. The courts also backed away from the "tender years" doctrine. See Devine v. Devine,
398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. App. 1981) (reversing the lower court's affirmation of the "tender
years" doctrine and stating it should be considered along with other factors in the case); see also Com-
monwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 639 (Pa. 1977) (questioning the validity of the
"tender years" doctrine and reversing the lower court's presumption in favor of the mother); Odegard
v. Odegard, 259 N.W.2d 484, 486 (N.D. 1977) (rejecting the mother's assertion that placing her son in
the custody of his grandparents violated the "tender years" doctrine).
72. Sexton, supra note 65, at 771.
73. Id. at 771-72.
74. Id.
75. Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder
to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 395, 395 (2000).
76. Id. at 396.
77. Kathleen Niggemyer, Parental Alienation is Open Heart Surgery: It Needs More Than a
Band-Aid to Fix It, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 567, 576 (1998).
78. See id. at 574 (paraphrasing the court's definition and noting that the blame for the alienation
is on only one parent); see also Ludlow v. Ludlow, 201 P.2d 579, 582 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
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had developed a theory regarding parental alienation. 79 Gardner distin-
guished between parental alienation and parental alienation syndrome.
80
Parental alienation focuses on the acts of the alienating parent, whereas
parental alienation syndrome focuses on the acts of the child, who has
become an active participant in the alienating parent's campaign to vilify
the target parent. 81
Gardner drew a picture of a typical alienating parent as the custodial
mother, trying to turn the children against the noncustodial father. 82 He
described three stages or types of alienating activity that lead to parental
alienation syndrome. 83 These three stages or types are mild, moderate,
and severe. 84
In mild cases, the mothers have a good relationship with their
children and realize the importance of the noncustodial father in the
children's lives. 85 However, the mother has anger and a desire for ven-
geance and, as a result, alienates the children with slight prodding.
86 If
there is a custody dispute, the children side with their mother because of
the strong bond between mother and child.87
In a moderate case of parental alienation syndrome, the custodial
mother is more disturbed. 88 She is on a campaign to make the noncus-
todial father unwanted by the children. 89 She acts out of vengeance and
anger.90 She finds all sorts of excuses to frustrate visitation, and is not
receptive to court orders. 91 The children in this scenario do not want to
go on visitation with their father, but when they do go on visitation with
their father and get away from the custodial home, they give up their
resistance and enjoy their time with him.92
The custodial mother in a severe case is one who has never had a
good relationship with her children. 93 She is in a state of paranoia and
79. See generally RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME AND THE DIFFEREN-
TIATIONBETWEEN FABRICATED AND GENUINE CHILD SEX ABUSE, (1987). Dr. Gardner is a leader in the
field of child psychotherapy. Biography of Richard Gardner, M.D. available at: http://www.
lima-associates.com/gardnbio.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2001). He practices as a child psychologist
and an adult psychoanalyst. Id. He is also a Clinical Professor of Child Psychiatry at Columbia
University College of Physicians and Surgeons. Id.
80. GARDNER, supra note 79, at 67.
81. Id. at68.
82. Id. at 69.
83. RICHARD A. GARDNER, PSYCHOTHERAPY Wrm CHILDREN OF DIVORCE, 451 (1991).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 461.
86. Id.
87. Id.





93. Id. at 452.
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does anything she can to turn her children against the noncustodial par-
ent. 94 The children become actors in the campaign against their father
and totally resist visitations. 95 They scream and cry, run away, recite
descriptions of their father's past bad behavior as if it happened
yesterday and, similarly, fear his future bad behavior.96
Gardner's work is criticized by modern professionals as being gen-
der biased.9 7 Others claim that his work is still valid and "more convinc-
ing than his critics' [work]." 98 Douglas Damall takes Gardner's theory
and expands it.99
Darnall states that parental alienation can be caused by either par-
ent.100 Also, the roles of alienator and victim can be switched.101 A par-




97. Niggemyer, supra note 77, at 576. Niggemyer also states that mental health professionals re-
ject Gardner's assertion that custody should be changed only in a case of severe parental alienation.
Id. at 577 n.74 (citing STANLEY S. CLAWAR & BRYNNE V. RIVLIN, CHILDREN HELD HOSTAGE: DEALING
WrrH PROGRAMMED AND BRAINWASHED CHILDREN 4 (1991)). Other professionals reject the theory
because of lack of statistics. Id. at 576 n.68 (citing Cheri L. Wood, The Parental Alienation Syndrome:
A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1367 (1994), and noting that professionals reject
Gardner because of no peer review or statistics to back up his theories).
98. Barry Bricklin & Gail Elliot, Qualifications of and Techniques to be Used by Judges, Attor-
neys, and Mental Health Professionals Who Deal With Children in High Conflict Divorce Cases, 22 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 501, 517-18 (2000) (arguing that even without statistics, Gardner's scientific
methodology is careful and valued).
99. Douglas Darnall, Parental Alienation: Not in the Best Interest of the Children, 75 N.D. L.
REV. 323, 326-27 (1999). Douglas Darnall practices as a licensed psychologist, is CEO of a
psychiatric clinic in Youngstown, Ohio, and is the author of DIVORCE CASUALTIES: PROTECTING YOUR
CHILDREN FROM PARENTAL ALIENATION (1998). Id. at 323.
100. Id. at 326. Darnall identifies three kinds of alienators. Id. at 327. The first group consists of
the naive alienator. Id. This person is cooperative about the relationship with the children and the
other parent. Id. Things are said on occasion, however, that damage that other relationship. Id. Most
well-meaning parents can be naive alienators. Id. The child in this setting is able to dismiss most of
the negative remarks and is unhurt by them. Id. at 353. The victim must have faith in his or her rela-
tionship with the child and focus on strengthening that relationship, not retaliating. Id. It may even be
possible to talk to the alienating parent and make him or her aware of the problem. Id. The second
group of alienators consists of the active alienator. Id. at 327. This parent is dealing with hurt and
anger, and it is triggered by actions of the ex-spouse, causing the parent to lose control. Id. The state-
ments and actions will be damaging to the relationship of the child and victim parent; however, the
alienating parent is able to see that his behavior was wrongful. Id. Again, the victim parent must have
faith in the relationship with the child and not retaliate. Id. at 354. Both parents need to be educated
on parental alienation and parental alienation syndrome and go to counseling. Id. The third group con-
sists of the obsessed alienator. Id. at 327. This parent is on a "crusade to protect the child from the
evil of the court and targeted parent." Id. This person will gather support for his or her position and
have a group of people available to verify what is going on. Id. The obsessed alienator justifies
actions even when those actions are irrational. Id. Court orders will most likely not be obeyed. Id.
The victim parent faces a difficult situation. Id. at 354. He or she may not be able to communicate
with the children. Id. Visitation may be impossible because of roadblocks put up by the alienator as
well as refusal by the children. Id. at 354. Retaliation, or any act, will be used against the victim by
the alienating parent. Id. at 355. The victim parent must seek support and get legal help. Id.
101. Id. at 326.
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the alienator; now the roles are reversed.102 Darnall stresses the impor-
tance of professionals being able to identify this behavior in its early
stage because that is when it is best treated, and treatment at an early
stage can prevent parental alienation syndrome.103
B. PARENTAL ALIENATION LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Legislature has responded to the problem of
parental alienation and its accompanying parental alienation syn-
drome. 104 In 1993, Senators Holmberg, Evanson, Maxon, and Represen-
tatives Kelsch and Mahoney introduced a bill in the North Dakota
Legislature addressing allegations of child abuse or sexual abuse in child
custody determinations. 105 A two-part bill was passed.10 6 The first part
of the law created a new subdivision, subdivision 1, to North Dakota
Century Code section 14-09-06.2.107 This created a new factor for the
court to consider when placing or modifying custody. 108 It stated,
"[t]he making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent
against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section
50-25.1-02."109 The second part of the law created a new section to
chapter 14-09 called "Allegation of harm to child-Effect."110 It stated,
"[i]f the court finds that an allegation of harm to a child by one parent
against the other is false and not made in good faith, the court shall
order the parent making the false allegation to pay court costs and
102. Id.
103. Id. at 324 Darnell lists actions of alienating parents that judges, attorneys, and other profes-
sionals can identify and treat. Id. at 328-29. Examples of these actions are telling the child that it is
the child's choice of whether to go on visitation and refusing the target parent access to the child's
medical and school records. Id. He also lists symptoms of parental alienation syndrome that can be
identified in the child and treated. Some of the symptoms include: ongoing hatred of the targeted
parent, refusing visitation, and not respecting the court's authority. Id.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(1) (1997).
105. S. 2488, 53d Leg. (N.D. 1993).




109. Id. Section 14-09-06.2(1) factors for placing or modifying custody include: (a) emotional
ties between child and parents; (b) capacity of parents to provide affection, guidance, and education;
(c) capacity to provide material needs; (d) length of time and stability of child's present environment;
(e) permanence of existing or proposed custodial home; (f) moral fitness of parents; (g) mental and
physical health of the parents; (h) home, school, and community record of the child; (i) reasonable
preference of the child; (j) evidence of domestic violence; (k) evidence of household presence of
person who may harm the child; (1) the making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one
parent against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02; and (in) any other factors
considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. Id.
110. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.5 (1997).
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reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the other parent in responding to
the allegation."' 1 1
The North Dakota Legislature passed a law in 1997 that specifically
addressed post-judgment custody modifications.11 2 Subsections five and
six allow the court to look at both frustration of visitation and other acts
of parental alienation before a custody order has been in place for two
years and again after the two years have run.11 3
Many North Dakota cases address the problem of a parent turning
the child against the other parent in a divorce situation. 114 The first case
that seemed to frame the problem as alienation, however, was McAdams
v. McAdams,115 in which the court denied custody to the father because
he had alienated the son against his mother. 1 l6 In a later case, Loll v.
Loll,117 the court clearly addressed parental alienation syndrome and dis-
cussed the weight that should be given to the testimony of a licensed
psychologist who was treating one of the children in the case.118 The
mother asserted that the psychologist was unaware that the child he was
treating had been alienated from the mother by the child's father. 119
The court noted that both parents contributed to conflict in visitations. 120
In Brown v. Brown,121 the mother wanted the court to grant her custody
Ill. Id.
112. See Postjudgment Custody Modification Motions, ch. 149, 1997 N.D. Laws at 762-63
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6 (1997)).
113. Id. Subsections five and six read as follows:
5. The court may not modify a prior custody order within the two-year period following
the date of entry of an order establishing custody unless the court finds the
modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child and:
a. The persistent and willful denial or interference with visitation;
b. The child's present environment may endanger the child's physical or
emotional health or impair the child's emotional development; or
c. The primary physical care of the child has changed to the other parent for
longer than six months.
6. The court may modify a prior custody order after the two-year period following the
date of entry of an order establishing custody if the court finds:
a. On the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior order or which were
unknown to the court at the time of the prior order, a material change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties; and
b. The modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(5) & (6) (1997).
114. See Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 834 (N.D. 1993) (turning a child away from the
other parent by "poisoning the well"); see also Leppart v. Leppart 519 N.W.2d 287, 289-90 (N.D.
1994) (turning children against their father because he had left the cult-like faith of the mother).
115. 530 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1995).
116. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d at 650. The court quoted Johnson v. Schlotman when it stated that
the custodial parent has a duty to nurture the child's relationship with his noncustodial parent. Id.
(citing Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 834 (N.D. 1993)).
117. 1997 ND 51,561 N.W.2d 625.
118. Loll 22, 561 N.W.2d at 630.
119. Id. 21.
120. Id. 16, 561 N.W.2d at 629.
121. 1999 ND 199, 600 N.W.2d 869.
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of the child because of predicted future alienation if the child stayed
with the father. 122 The court denied change of custody on that basis, but
stated that "[e]vidence of parental alienation is a significant factor in
determining custody."123
C. OTHER STATES' APPROACHES TO PARENTAL ALIENATION
North Dakota's neighboring state legislatures have similarly aban-
doned the tender years doctrine and replaced it with a best interests of
the child standard. 124 Minnesota states in its modification of order stat-
ute that "[the court] shall not prohibit a motion to modify a custody
order or parenting plan if [it] finds that there is persistent and willful
denial or interference with parenting time [visitation], or has reason to
believe that the child's present environment may endanger the child's
physical or emotional health or impair the child's emotional develop-
ment." 125 In Crews v. McKenna,126 the court found the custodial mother
was alienating the children from their noncustodial father. 127 It deter-
mined that the need to remove the children from that environment did
not outweigh the possible emotional and developmental damage that
would be done to the children if custody were changed to the father.128
The court decided that the better solution was to modify the present
custody order to joint physical custody. 129
Wisconsin's parental alienation statute states in part:
a court may modify an order of physical placement at any time
with respect to periods of physical placement if it finds that a
parent has repeatedly and unreasonably failed to exercise peri-
ods of physical placement awarded under an order of physical
placement that allocates specific times for the exercise of
periods of physical placement. 130
122. Brown, 21, 600 N.W.2d at 874.
123. id. (citing Loll v. Loll, 16, 561 N.W.2d 625).
124. See infra notes 125-145 and accompanying text.
125. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(c) (West 1990 & Supp. 2001). In 2001, the State of Minnesota
changed its statute, substituting the more inclusive "parenting time" instead of simply "visitation." Id.
126. No. C3-98-75, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 793 (Minn. Ct. App. July 7, 1998).
127. Crews, No. C3-98-75, 1998 Minn. App. LEXIS 793, at *7.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *8.
130. Wis. S TAT. ANN. § 767.325(2m) (West Supp. 2000). Wisconsin uses the words "physical
placement" to mean both the child's custodial home and his or her visitations with his or her noncus-
todial parent. Id. In addition, the statute addresses both the situation in which the custodial parent is
interfering with visitations of the noncustodial parent, and the situation when the noncustodial parent
does not exercise his or her visitation privileges. Id.
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In Hughes v. Hughes,131 a Wisconsin case, the court changed custody to
the noncustodial father based on a number of factors weighing against
the custodial mother. 132 Significant in the findings were the facts that
the mother had alienated the daughter from her father and that the father
was the parent better able to set aside his interests and make decisions in
the best interests of the daughter. 133
Iowa's child custody statute considers "the denial by one parent of
the child's opportunity for maximum continuing contact with the other
parent, without just cause, a significant factor in determining the proper
custody arrangement."1 34 In re Marriage of Rosenfeldl35 was a case in
which the court found that both the custodial father and his wife (the
step-mother) were alienating the children from their noncustodial
mother. 136 The court looked at the testimony as well as the opinions of
experts and concluded that the children needed to spend more time with
their mother; it found that this was best accomplished by transferring
custody to the mother.137
South Dakota does not address parental alienation in its child cus-
tody statute.138 One South Dakota academician sees this area of the law
as one where the court can have only guidelines and principles when
making child custody determinations. 139 The South Dakota courts do,
however, recognize parental alienation and, like their neighboring courts,
change the custody to the alienated parent when it is in the best interests
of the child.140
131. 588 N.W.2d 346 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
132. Hughes, 588 N.W.2d at 349-51.
133. Id. at 349.
134. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(l)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
135. 524 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
136. In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d at 214.
137. Id.
138. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (Michie 1999). The statute reads:
In an action for divorce, the court may, before or after judgment, give such direction for
the custody, care, and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary
or proper, and may at any time vacate or modify the same. In awarding the custody of a
child, the court shall be guided by consideration of what appears to be for the best
interests of the child in respect to the child's temporal and mental and moral welfare. If
the child is of a sufficient age to form an intelligent preference, the court may consider
that preference in determining the question. As between parents adversely claiming the
custody, neither parent may be given preference over the other in determining custody.
Id.
139. Roger M. Baron, Child Custody Determinations in South Dakota: How South Dakota Courts
Decide Child Custody Cases, 40 S.D. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (1995).
140. See Jeschke v. Wockenfuss, 534 N.W.2d 602, 604-05 (S.D. 1995) (affirming S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-45 as the trial court's authority to change custody).
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Montana, like North Dakota, has included a subsection dealing with
parental alienation in its best interests of the child factors. 141 It reads,
"adverse effects on the child resulting from continuous and vexatious
parenting plan amendment actions." 142 In addition, Montana's Amend-
ment of parenting plan-mediation statute addresses frustration of
visitation as a symptom of parental alienation.143 It allows the court to
modify a parenting plan when "one parent has willfully and consistently
.. refused to allow the child to have any contact with the other parent;
or . . .attempted to frustrate or deny contact with the child by the other
parent . "144 Montana's caselaw shows its readiness and its need to
address parental alienation.145
D. WAYS TO DEAL WITH PARENTAL ALIENATION
1. Sue for Alienation of Children's Affection
An unpopular suggestion in dealing with parental alienation was to
create a tort for parental alienation. 146 A victim parent could sue the
alienating parent for alienation of the children's affections.147 A lower
Minnesota court created the tort of "intentional interference with cus-
tody rights," to deal specifically with cases where the noncustodial par-
ent kidnapped the children.148 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
the tort, holding that "[e]xpanding the adversarial process to include this
new tort is contrary to the best interests of children and will only inten-
sify intrafamily conflict growing out of marriage dissolution without
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(m) (2001).
142. Id. Montana's parenting plan encompasses support, custody, and visitation. Id.
143. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-219(1)(d)(i) & (ii) (2001).
144. Id.
145. See In re Marriage of Miller, 825 P.2d 189, 192 (Mont. 1992) (transferring custody to non-
custodial father when custodial mother's refusal of visitation was listed among factors that endangered
the children); see also In re Marriage of Moseman, 830 P.2d 1304, 1307 (Mont. 1992) (transferring
custody to noncustodial mother by finding parental alienation in custodial father's acts of denying
visitation, refusing to give the mother his telephone number, not telling the mother of one of the
children's tonsillectomy, and not telling the mother of the children's school performance); In re Mar-
riage of Cook, 725 P.2d 562, 565 (Mont. 1986) (transferring custody to noncustodial father because
custodial mother's alienating acts, such as threatening to move to another country and never allowing
the father to see the children again, were endangering the children's mental and emotional health).
146. Niggemyer, supra note 77, at 575.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 575-76.
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deterring parental abduction."14 9 Based upon this negative reception, a
future for the tort of parental alienation is unlikely.150
2. Establish Joint Legal Custody
A second way to deal with parental alienation and the accompany-
ing parental alienation syndrome is to establish joint legal custody. 151 In
this arrangement, both parents share in making decisions for raising the
child.152 One parent may still be the custodial parent.153 In this arrange-
ment, however, the children often reside with one parent on certain days
of the week and with the other parent on the remaining days of the week,
or the parents alternate living in the custodial home, with the result that
the children do not move between homes.154
Adherents of joint legal custody see it as a means of doing away
with the custody battle in which the winning parent gets physical custody
and the primary parenting rights.155 Both parents remain active in their
children's lives and the children see less conflict. 156 Those who do not
see joint legal custody as the answer to the parental alienation/parental
alienation syndrome problem, focus on two divorcing parents who can-
not get along. 157 "[W]hen post-decree squabbles develop, the law is not
really equipped with a mechanism to promptly designate the most
appropriate custodian .. .leaving the child in limbo pending a judicial
resolution."158
In most cases, joint custody does not work well, but it is a viable
solution when the parents are willing to make it work.159 Possessing
149. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1990). The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned
that its adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the courts' protection of child cus-
tody and visitation do a better job of protecting children from being kidnapped by the noncustodial
parent, than would a tort law for parental alienation. Id.
150. Niggemyer, supra note 77, at 576.
151. Sexton, supra note 65, at 777-78; see also IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 666 (3d ed.
1998) (distinguishing between joint physical custody in which both parents share in the physical care
of the child, and joint legal custody in which both parents have legal authority to make important
decisions that affect the child).
152. Baron, supra note 139, at 430.
153. Id. at 432.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Sexton, supra note 65, at 775-76.
157. See Baron, supra note 139, at 431 n.127 (quoting a judge who said, "[t]hese people have al-
ready had one shot at sharing the responsibilities and decisions of child rearing-it was called marriage.
And they are in front of me precisely because they cannot make a success of sharing those responsi-
bilities and decisions." (quoting Catherine N. Carroll, Ducking the Real Issue of Joint Custody, 5 FAM.
ADVOC. 18, 21 (1982))).
158. Id. at 431.
159. Id. at 432.
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good problem solving skills and also living in the same community are
two parental requirements to making it work.160
3. Mediation
Mediation is a third method to try to avoid parental alienation.
16 1
In mediation, a neutral third party works with the parents to resolve their
differences involving the children. 162 Mediation can occur at any time
before, during, or after the divorce proceedings.163
A parent can get a court order making mediation mandatory in the
event of conflicts.164 One suggestion is that both the custodial parent
and the noncustodial parent give the court a periodic report on the
absence or presence of alienating behavior.165 When the court sees no
such behavior, it can simply file the report away. 166 When it does find
alienating behavior, the court can require mediation.167 Only when
mediation fails would the parties have to go back into court and litigate
their differences.168
Many states also include educational programs with mediation. 169
Parents are educated about the process of divorce and how it impacts
themselves, as well as how it impacts their children. 170 The goal is to
improve parental attitudes and behavior through awareness and
knowledge.171
III. ANALYSIS
The North Dakota Supreme Court had to consider four issues when
it decided Hendrickson III: (1) whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion when it denied change of venue, 172 (2) whether it was erroneous to
160. Id.
161. Darnall, supra note 99, at 358.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. California has mandatory mediation when the court sees custody and visitation contests
in pleadings. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(a) (West Supp. 2001).




169. Schepard, supra note 75, at 411.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson (Hendrickson 111), 2000 ND 1, 10, 603 N.W.2d 896, 900.
Diane stated that the parties would be inconvenienced if they had to come to Dickinson for the remand
hearing. Id. She cited Whitehead v. Whitehead, 336 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (N.D. 1983), in which the
court held that a motion for change of venue should not be denied when both parties and all material
witnesses lived outside the county. Id. This court noted that in Whitehead, the request of change of
venue was made before the evidentiary hearing. Id. In this case, the evidentiary hearing has already
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change custody to Mark, 173 (3) whether it was erroneous to deny visita-
tion to Diane for one year,174 and (4) whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it ordered Diane to attend counseling with a counselor
of Mark's choice. 175
Diane asserted that the trial court changed custody to Mark to pun-
ish her for contempt of court. 176 This court noted that the trial court's
order of April 26, 1999 contained no language finding Diane in con-
tempt.177 Therefore, there was no reason to conclude the change of
custody occurred as a contempt sanction. 178 Diane further asserted that
Mark had withdrawn his April 1998 motion to change custody, and
therefore, the trial court had no power to change the custody.179 The
supreme court noted, however, that Mark had stated in his cross-appeal
in Hendrickson II that the court should have granted his motion to
change custody of the children.180 It was therefore proper to include the
change of custody issue during the remand hearing.181
Diane's next contention was that even if it was proper for the trial
court to hear the change of custody issue, it could not order a change
of custody without an evidentiary hearing.1 82 The court noted that a
full evidentiary hearing had been held before Hendrickson II was
appealed.183 It was not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing for a
second time at the remand hearing.184
occurred and there are no witnesses to be inconvenienced. Id. The court concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Diane's motion for change of venue. Id.
173. Id. I 11-20, 603 N.W.2d at 900-02.
174. Id. 21, 603 N.W.2d at 902-03.
175. Id. 7 22-23, 603 N.W.2d at 903.
176. Id. 12, 603 N.W.2d at 900. Diane asserted in her Reply Brief to the trial court's order of
April 26, 1999 that she was held in contempt because she had come into the disfavor of the court.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, Hendrickson III (No. 990123). That disfavor arose out of her objection
when the trial court accepted in full the report of GAL Karen Mueller. Id. Diane rejected the judge's
findings that there was a significant change in circumstances and that it was in the best interests of the
children to change custody to Mark. Id.
177. Hendrickson I11, 13, 603 N.W.2d at 901.
178. Id. This court rejected Diane's assertions that the lower court held her in contempt and
changed custody without going through the two-step process discussed in Mosbrucker v. Mosbrucker,
1997 ND 72, 562 N.W.2d 390. Appellant's Brief at 7, Hendrickson III (No. 990123).
179. Hendrickson III, 12, 603 N.W.2d at 900.
180. Id. 14, 603 N.W.2d at 901.
181. Id.
182. Id. 12, 603 N.W.2d at 900.
183. Id. 1 15, 603 N.W.2d at 901.
184. Id. The court looked at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(4) for further authority. Id. This
subsection states the requirements for a party seeking modification of a custody order. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-06.6(4) (1997). The movant must file the moving papers and give notice to the other
party. Id. The court will set a date for an evidentiary hearing if it determines the movant has made a
prima facie case to change custody. Id. The court noted the evidentiary hearing was held, and the




Diane then argued that the trial court's decision to change custody
to Mark was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support
the decision. 185 The court cited to Mosbrucker v. Mosbrucker186 for the
test of whether a finding of fact is clearly erroneous. 187 The rule in Mos-
brucker states, "[a] finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is [1] in-
duced by an erroneous view of the law, [2] if there is no evidence to
support it, or [3] if it is clear to the reviewing court that a mistake has
been made." 188
Diane's assertion of no evidence relied on the two-step analysis a
court must apply when it considers a change of custody: (1) whether
there has been a significant change of circumstances since the divorce,
and (2) if there has been a significant change of circumstances, whether
that change requires a change of custody to protect the best interests of
the child.18 9 The court listed many of Diane's actions that contributed
to alienation of the children toward their father as well as the frustration
of Mark's visitations. 190 Diane took the children away from the home at
the time of a scheduled visitation. 191 She refused to let Mark take the
children at other attempted visitations. 192 She refused to cooperate with
Mark when he wanted to schedule visitations. 193 The court noted that
many attempts were made to improve the visitation, but none of them
succeeded. 194
The court relied on Blotske v. Leidholm, 195 which stated that a court
should first try to make a more rigid visitation schedule before it consid-
ered a change of custody. 196 There had been many attempts to do this
in the present case. 197 The court's ultimate authority was the Allegation
of Harm to Child statute. 198 It stated that persistent frustration of visita-
tion could make a change of custody necessary when it creates an
environment that "may endanger the child's physical or emotional
185. Hendrickson I1, 16,603 N.W.2d at 901.
186. 1997 ND 72, 562 N.W.2d 390.
187. Mosbrucker v. Mosbrucker, 1997 ND 72, 6, 562 N.W.2d 390 at 392; see also N.D. R. Civ.
P. 52(a) (stating that "findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous").
188. Hendrickson III, 16, 603 N.W.2d at 901 (citing the rule from Mosbrucker).
189. Id. Diane asserted that there was no change of circumstances because there had been no
further deterioration of the relationship between the children and Mark. Brief for Appellant at 18,
Hendrickson III (No. 990123).





195. 487 N.W.2d 607 (N.D. 1992).
196. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992).
197. Hendrickson III, 2000 ND 1, 6, 603 N.W.2d at 899.
198. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.5 (1997).
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health or impair the child's emotional development." 199 The court
stated that it could deduce from the trial court's findings that the lower
court made a correct conclusion of law. 200 The record showed that
Diane, by making it impossible for Mark to visit the children, was
hurting the children. 201 The children had a right to visitation by their
noncustodial parent. 202 To withhold that right worked against the best
interests of the children. 203 The trial court's decision to change custody
of the children to Mark was not clearly erroneous because the other
remedy of more specific visitation was first tried.204
Diane made a last assertion regarding the change of custody in
which she argued that she did not get a chance to cross-examine the
guardian ad litem regarding her report.205 The supreme court noted that
this issue was raised for the first time in Diane's reply brief.206 This goes
against the rule that a reply brief must address only the new matters that
are raised in appellee's brief.207 Therefore, the court stated that it would
not address the matter of Diane not being able to cross-examine the
GAL.208
Next the court reviewed the trial court's order to deny visitation for
one year.209 The court reiterated that the child has a right to visitation
from the noncustodial parent. 2 10 It went on to say that the situation is
reversed now that Mark has custody, and Diane, as the non-custodial
parent, should not be denied visitation. 211 Visitation should not be
denied unless it would "endanger the child's physical or emotional
health," and there would have to be a demonstration of that kind of
harm before visitation should be denied. 212 The court determined that
supervised visitation of the children by Diane should be tried before she
is denied visitation.2 13
199. Id.







207. N.D. R. App. P. 28(c). The court noted in a footnote that its holding in Quarne v. Quarne
remained intact. Hendrickson II1, 20, 603 N.W.2d at 902 n.i. The court held in that case that "it
was reversible error for a trial court, when making a custody decision, to rely on facts in an
investigator's report without allowing the party to call and cross-examine the investigator." Id. (citing
Quarne v. Quame, 1999 ND 188,1 6, 601 N.W.2d 256, 258).
208. Hendrickson III, 20, 603 N.W.2d at 902.
209. Id. 21.
210. Id. (citing Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 902-03.
213. Id. at 903.
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CASE COMMENT
The court's final issue was whether the court abused its discretion
when it ordered that Diane attend counseling with a counselor of Mark's
choosing. 2 14 The court cited Krizan v. Krizan215 where it had laid out a
rule to determine when a trial court abused its discretion. 216 The rule
states, "[a] trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an arbi-
trary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when its decision is
not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned
determination." 21 7 The trial court had concluded that Diane's behavior
showed she needed counseling, but letting Mark choose the counselor
for Diane was not the best way to serve that need.218 It was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to allow Mark to choose Diane's
counselor.2 19
The court then looked at Johnson v. Schlotman, 220 which held that
a trial court was correct to order a child to receive counseling if it was in
the child's best interests. 221 The court determined that it was reasonable
for a trial court to order counseling for a parent as well, if it is in the best
interest of the child. 222 The court agreed that the trial court was correct
when it ordered counseling for Diane. 223 The court stated that counsel-
ing is especially important where there is parental alienation because the
child's emotional attachment to the alienated parent may never be strong
without treatment of the alienating parent.224 The court did not agree
that the situation would be best served by letting Mark choose the coun-
selor.225 The court ordered that the trial court should obtain a list of
counselors from both Diane and Mark, and then choose the counselor
for Diane from the names on the lists.226
In Hendrickson III, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that (1)
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a change of
venue, (2) there was enough evidence to warrant changing custody of the
214. Id. 22.
215. 1998 ND 186, 585 N.W.2d 576.
216. Krizan, 13, 585 N.W.2d at 580.




220. 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993).
221. Johnson, 502 N.W.2d at 835-36.
222. Hendrickson I1, 23, 603 N.w.2d at 903. By approving the trial court's order of counsel-
ing for the children in Johnson, the North Dakota Supreme Court could determine in Hendrickson III
that the trial court could order counseling for the parent if that counseling was in the best interests of
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children to Mark, (3) Diane as the noncustodial parent was entitled to
supervised visitations, and (4) the counselor for Diane was to be chosen
from among the list of names supplied to the trial court by both Mark
and Diane.227 The court remanded the case for modification.2 28 Subse-
quently, after remand, custody was changed again because of the
behavior of the children.229
IV. IMPACT
The problem of parental alienation and its accompanying parental
alienation syndrome will not soon go away.2 30 The abandonment of the
"tender years" doctrine, presuming the mother to be the better parent,
and the adoption of the best interests of the child doctrine, awarding
custody to the parent who has the best parenting capacity, have both
created an in- and out-of-courtroom competition for the best parent
award.2 31 This competition can take the form of parental alienation,
such as turning the children away from one parent in an effort to prove
that the other is the better parent. 232 In the extreme cases, the child takes
an active part in putting down the victim parent in parental alienation
syndrome. 233
The North Dakota Supreme Court used strong language in
Hendrickson 111.234 It stated that divorced parents may not use their
children as weapons to win battles in their war against each other.235 It
also stated that children need a healthy relationship with both parents. 236
Both parents (custodial and noncustodial) have a duty to nurture the
child's relationship with the other parent. 237 The court took the difficult
step of awarding custody to the noncustodial parent when the custodial
parent prevented visitation between the children and the noncustodial
parent. 238
227. Id. 25, 603 N.W.2d at 903.
228. Id.
229. In re C.H., 2001 ND 37, 19, 622 N.W.2d 720, 725. The custody issue came before the
juvenile court because of the children's unruly behavior while in their father's custody. Id. 15, 622
N.W.2d at 724-25. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to place custody of the
children back to Diane. Id. 19, 622 N.W.2d at 725. Justice Sandstrom dissented, arguing that the
mother created the toxic situation and this decision only rewarded her behavior. Id. 25, 622 N.W.2d
at 725-26.
230. GARDNER, supra note 79, at 68.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 69.







Hendrickson III has already been cited by twelve North Dakota
Supreme Court cases. In Kautzman v. Kautzman239 the court used
Hendrickson III as authority to rule that an additional evidentiary
hearing was not needed. 240 The court makes it clear that "when we
reverse and remand for a trial court to address an issue or to redetermine
a matter, unless otherwise specified, the trial court may decide based on
the evidence already before it or may take additional evidence." 241
Olson v. Olson242 cited and quoted Hendrickson III to make the
point that children need a healthy relationship with both parents and
both parents must facilitate that bond. 243 The court allowed the custodial
mother to move with the child to Houston, Texas, and it used the
Hendrickson III language to point out the need for the child to have
visitation with her father who remained in North Dakota.244
Schiff v. Schiff24 5 cited Hendrickson III to make the point that visita-
tion is not merely a privilege of the noncustodial parent; it is a right of
the child.246 Physical or emotional harm must be demonstrated before
that visitation is denied.247
Anderson v. Resler248 cited both Hendrickson II and Hendrickson
111.249 The court cited Hendrickson I to show that a change of custody
is a drastic measure and should be used only after alternate solutions
have been tried. 250 It then cited Hendrickson III to further explain the
process of change of custody when frustration of visitation is present. 251
In Hurt v. Hurt,252 the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that
both parents seemed to be frustrating visitation. 253 Hendrickson III was
cited when the court stated that visitation by the noncustodial parent is
239. 2000 ND 116, 611 N.W.2d 883.
240. Kautzman, 8, 611 N.W.2d at 885.
241. Id. 7 (citing Moch v. Moch, 1998 ND 95, 9, 578 N.w.2d 129 and Kern v. Kelner, 32
N.W.2d 169, 174 (N.D. 1948)).
242. 2000 ND 120, 611 N.W.2d 892.
243. Olson, 8, 611 N.w.2d at 896.
244. Id. 6, 611 N.W.2d at 895.
245. 2000 ND 113, 611 N.W.2d 191.
246. Schiff, 9, 611 N.w.2d at 195; see also McDowell v. McDowell, 2001 ND 176, 28, 635
N.W.2d 139, available at 2001 N.D. LEXIS 188, at *22.
247. Id.; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, 24, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (citing Hendrick-
son III to point out that visitation by the noncustodial parent is a right of the child and is presumed to be
in the best interests of the child); K.L.G. v. S.L.N., 2001 ND 33, 11, 622 N.W.2d 230, 235 (2001)
(citing Hendrickson III and stating the presumption that visitation by the noncustodial parent is in the
best interests of the child, and denial of visitation should occur only when physical or emotional harm
may result).
248. 2000 ND 183, 618 N.W.2d 480.
249. Anderson, 10, 618 N.W.2d at 485.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 2001 ND 13, 621 N.W. 2d 326.
253. Hurt, 14, 621 N.W.2d at 331.
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not only in the best interests of the child; it is a right of the child.254
When that visitation is frustrated by the custodial parent, the court may
be justified in changing custody. 255 Hendrickson II was cited when the
court reasoned that a custodial mother has a duty to nurture her chil-
dren's relationship with their noncustodial father, even when she sees
imperfections in the father.256
The cases citing both Hendrickson II and Hendrickson III show a
willingness of the North Dakota Supreme Court, like its neighboring
supreme courts, to work out situations that maximize the child's relation-
ship with both parents. 257 This kind of reasoning goes directly toward
solving the problem of parental alienation and its accompanying
parental alienation syndrome. 258
V. CONCLUSION
A goal to improve parental attitudes and parental behavior in a
divorce proceeding can be characterized as a lofty goal. Yet, at the end
of the day, it is the parents who choose how to interact with their chil-
dren-whether in a constructive or destructive way. Hendrickson III
makes it clear that the parent who chooses to destroy the child's relation-
ship with the other parent by withholding visitation will be seen by the
court as a parent who is not working for the best interests of the child.259
The court may change custody in that situation, for the good of the
child.260 It is not about being the better parent. It is about what is in the





257. See Schiff v. Schiff, 2000 ND 113, 9, 611 N.W.2d 191, 195 (stating that visitation by the
noncustodial parent is a right of the child); see also Hurt, 14, 621 N.W.2d at 331(stating it is the
custodial parent's duty to nurture the child's relationship with the noncustodia parent).
258. See Hurt, 14, 621 N.W.2d at 331 (stating that the custodial parent has a duty not to "poison
the well" and subsequently turn the children away from their noncustodial parent).
259. Hendrickson 111, 2000 ND I 18, 603 N.W.2d 896, 901-02.
260. Id.
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